This article attempts to solve the empirical puzzle posed by the way the Finnish diplomatic missions issue Schengen visas to the Russians. Building on the theory of the Self and the Other, a theoretical expectation about the uniformity of the Schengen visa regime is brought forward and further checked against the legal reality of the European Union common visa policy and the Finnish-Russian visa issuance arrangements. The case study of the experience that the Finns have with the Russians coming to their territory and history of the Finnish-Russian relations is carried out to dismantle the panoply of motives and meanings laying behind a particular visa regime and to show how the interplay of various political, economic and social factors works to produce peculiar policy outcomes. The main findings prove that despite both theoretical expectations and legal rules governing the Schengen borders and visas, in practice different member states apply the 'common' regime differently depending on both economic rationale and historical memories.
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SCHENGEN BORDERS IN PRACTICE: FACTS ABOUT FINLAND (AND RUSSIA)
This article attempts to solve the empirical puzzle posed by the way the Finnish diplomatic missions issue Schengen visas to the Russians. Building on the theory of the Self and the Other, a theoretical expectation about the uniformity of the Schengen visa regime is brought forward and further checked against the legal reality of the European Union common visa policy and the Finnish-Russian visa issuance arrangements. The case study of the experience that the Finns have with the Russians coming to their territory and history of the Finnish-Russian relations is carried out to dismantle the panoply of motives and meanings laying behind a particular visa regime and to show how the interplay of various political, economic and social factors works to produce peculiar policy outcomes. The main findings prove that despite both theoretical expectations and legal rules governing the Schengen borders and visas, in practice different member states apply the 'common' regime differently depending on both economic rationale and historical memories.
JEL Classification: F55.
Keywords: Borders, visa policy, Schengen, Finnish-Russian relations, EU-Russian relations, Self and Other.
INTRODUCTION
One remarkable fact about Finland is that in 2012 its four consular missions in Russia issued over 1.3 million Schengen visas to Russian citizens. This is around one fourth of the Finnish population. It is also roughly one fifth of all the Schengen visas issued by the 58 Russia-based Schengen consulates that year (European Commission 2013) . Estonia, the second most attractive Schengen destination in Russia (as measured by the number of border crossings, see Rosturizm 2009 Rosturizm , 2011 Rosturizm , 2013a , only issued 128 thousand visas in 2012 (European Commission 2013), and thus did not even make up for one tenth of the Finnish record. And Germany, with a population 15 times the population of Finland, issued some 400 thousand visas (European Commission 2013), or less than one third of the Finnish figure.
Finland did not only top the list of the most popular European Union (EU) countries among the Russians. It was solely Ukraine that outstripped Finland in the chart of countries the Russians visited the most in 2012 (Rosturizm 2013b) . The Russians clearly have something for Finland, and it is no wonder then that being such a popular place to go, Finland is "the biggest visa issuing state in Russia" (Salminen and Moshes 2009:16) . One could frame this in terms of supply meeting demand, and with such a clear demand for visas, should it be surprising that the Finns deliver?
In fact, it should. For one thing, using the market metaphor to describe the world of visas and borders might be a stretch. Societies use visas for multiple reasons, but most importantly to control the (otherwise free) movement of persons across national borders, which essentially makes visas a means to check and restrict the demand for crossing a border, not to meet it.
Furthermore, the balance between wishing to keep foreigners off (as expressed through politics) and the economic inclination to let them in, may be complicated by societal attitudes towards certain nations and foreigners. This paper takes an example of the Finnish-Russian visa issuance arrangements to dismantle this panoply of motives and meanings and to show how this interplay of various political, economic 4 and social factors works to produce peculiar policy outcomes. Taking the case of Finland is particularly rewarding as Finland makes part of a broader visa regime alongside the other Schengen states, which allows for a meaningful comparison. I am arguing that despite the legal reality of the EU common visa policy, in practice different member states apply this 'common' regime differently depending both on their experiences with the third nationals coming to their territory and on historical memories, or, as it is put by Salminen and Moshes, on culture and history (Salminen and Moshes 2009:32) .
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section I review the theory of the Self and the Other and apply it to the Schengen visa regime. I move on to show just how particularly outstanding the Finnish visa practice is (as compared to the other Schengen states) in the second section. The third section presents analysis of the legal rules governing the common visa policy in the EU.
The fourth section is used to suggest an economic explanation for the Finnish outlier, and further supplements it with elements of most similar systems comparison to see if culture and history matter in visa regimes. This is achieved through comparing Finnish and Estonian visa policies for Russia.
THEORIZING SCHENGEN BORDERS
It was in the late 1980s that border as a concept emerged on the research agenda of various academic disciplines and became a matter of intense interdisciplinary inquiry. There are now many different ways of thinking about borders, starting with traditional perspectives of political geography, through mainstream international relations theories, and to diverse post-positivist approaches, both moderate and radical. Accordingly, depending on the perspective chosen, borders are either claimed to be mere physical barriers, or viewed as exclusively metaphorical constructs meaningless when stripped of the social context, with a number of approaches aspiring to integrate these arguments (for a detailed up-to-date overview, see Golunov 2012:9-27 ).
One possible way to think about borders in general, and Schengen borders in particular, is to consider them as a mechanism of identity construction and of distinguishing between the Self and the Other (see, e.g., Newman 2003 Newman , 2010 Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer 2005; Houtum 2010 ). In this perspective, state borders present both physical and symbolic instrument that "maintains and controls the inner ordered space and … separates it from the external Other,
[thus] preventing it from penetrating inside and challenging this [inner] order" (Golunov 2012:26) . Viewed from such an angle, borders are not just material lines fencing one state off 5 from another but they make integral part of the collective identity of the Self in almost Ratzelian sense (see, e.g., Barth 1998) .
A more subtle perspective, yet the one that also allows to think of borders simultaneously along geographical and metaphorical lines, is given by Alex Wendt who explicitly connects the inner / outer (or the Self and the Other) dichotomy to the concept of sovereignty. As he mentions, "there is no sovereignty without an other", for sovereignty is essentially a social construct, "and so it exists only by virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations" (Wendt 1992:412) . Borders, in this view, serve to mark these shared "understandings and expectations" and are therefore one major building block of sovereignty. At the same time, this does not mean that borders do no longer mark different geographical spaces under the international law, or that any doubt is cast upon their basic function of separating different sovereign states with their exclusive right to rule within their territorial limits (Golunov 2012:12) . To the contrary, according to Wendt, sovereignty has historically been primarily linked to territory (Wendt 1992:414) , and the geographical dimension of borders is therefore essential.
Taking this perspective allows for a slightly unusual view of the Schengen project. In this view, Schengen system with its abolition of border controls is not only a unique manifestation of voluntary surrender of a tangible part of European states' sovereignties but, first and foremost, a clear sign of the change in the "intersubjective understandings and expectations" that the European states have of themselves and towards each other. Wendt calls a stable system of such "intersubjective understandings and meanings" covering states' views of themselves and the international environment a role structure. We could therefore use the term to say that the launch of the Schengen project is a clear sign of a fundamental role structure transformation on the European continent, but how do we get to grips with this transformation? As Wendt argues, there are three ideal types of role structures, or cultures of anarchies, that characterize relations between states. These cultures are the Hobbesian culture of enmity, the Lockean culture of rivalry and the Kantian culture of friendship. In a sense, all three present a reflection of the expectations the Self has towards the Other. This way, the Hobbesian culture reflects the "kill or be killed" principle, that is the constant war of all against all. The Lockean culture allows for the "live and let live" system, in which war is a possible if undesirable means of communication between states, but as a norm states would rather mutually recognize each others' property rights and view their own security more in egoist and not competitive terms.
Finally, in the Kantian culture "war is no longer considered a legitimate way of settling disputes" (for more details, see Wendt 1992 Wendt , 1999 .
It is now often argued that since the end of the Second World War the relations between the Western European countries (and their North Atlantic counterparts) have mutated into the Kantian culture of friendship characterized by non-violence as a principle of dispute resolution, and the rule of mutual aid or, in other words, a principle of collective security (Wendt 1999:297-302) . Note though that borders present one key element of a state's national security, because it is these borders that the state would need to protect and secure to function in its identity of a sovereign state (Wendt 1992:414) , and border policies would therefore reflect the role structure existing between neighboring states.
Yet border policies can be particularly sensitive exactly because they do not necessarily deal with military threats. In most cases the Other crosses national borders unarmed, and the way the peaceful Other is treated is also indicative of the present role structure. The decision to abandon borders and border checks within the Schengen territory in 1995 marked the unique way in which the Schengen states have internalized this culture of friendship. Not only "the cognitive boundaries of the Self [were] extended to include the Other" (Wendt 1999 :305, my emphasis), but literally the states' physical borders were abolished to form the new collective Self.
Allowing such a deep trust towards each other and practicing this "we-feeling" within the Among various border-related policies, visas seem the most nuanced tool of marking the Self and the Other. Visas allow to socially construct the same border differently for different groups, or to make borders polysemic, to use Balibar's term (Balibar 2002:79) . Visa-free regime with the US, for instance, clearly reflects the culture of friendship existing between the EU and Washington. At the same time, this regime is still able to distinguish between the culture of friendship among the Schengen countries and the role structure of friendship existing between the EU and the US -most visible in the fact that the American citizens would still need to pass the passport control when entering the Schengen zone.
On the other hand, the 'black' list countries, whose nationals must have a visa to enter the EU border-free territory (Meloni 2005:50) , are clearly marked as the external Other vis-à-vis the collective Self of the Schengen states. Issuing a Schengen visa is a symbolic act of allowing the 7 Other into the collective Self, and, what is more important, any consulate of any Schengen country is, in fact, vested with this symbolic power of inviting foreigners on behalf of the collective Self. As Salminen and Moshes put it, "Schengen states have shared their national sovereignty with other Schengen states, thereby altering the whole essence of visa issuance" (Salminen and Moshes 2009:9) .
All these things being said (and often in language surprisingly high-flown for such a technical field), should not we be surprised to observe any variation in the visa policy implementation at all, and with extreme outliers of the Finnish scale in particular? In the sections that follow I review the Finnish visa issuance practice in Russia, scrutinize the Schengen legal regime to see how much divergence it allows for, and finally give a specific explanation for the Finnish case.
FINNISH-RUSSIAN VISA ARRANGEMENTS
It has already been mentioned in the introduction that the sheer amount of visas Finland issues to Russian citizens makes it a remarkable outlier. Yet this is not the only thing to set Finland apart and make the Finnish case so special. Another peculiarity symptomatic of the Finnish-Russian visa issuance regime is the fact that there is a huge disproportion between the number of the Schengen visas issued in the Northwestern Federal District of Russia (NWFD) and visas issued in Moscow, 89% and 11% respectively for the year 2012. Obviously the trend would normally be reverse, with the capital attracting more visas. This effect might be upset by the fact that the NWFD borders Finland, but then again, the same record for Estonia, that also borders the NWFD, is 63% and 37%, respectively. And for Germany that is the third most visited Schengen country (Rosturizm 2013a ) it goes 14% and 63%, respectively (European Commission 2013).
Another distinctive feature of the regime has to do with the 'type' of visas issued by the Finnish diplomatic missions in the NWFD -98% of them are multiple-entry 'C' visas valid for half a year or one year. This is again not the case with the other Schengen diplomatic missions, and even compared to Moscow, 98% of 'C' visas is quite outstanding, as only 42% of visas issued by the Finns in the Russian capital are multiple-entry visas (European Commission 2013) . And the common practice is for a Schengen member state to provide the applicant with a single-entry visa for the duration of stay equal to (or 15 days longer than) the period of the planned trip. Moreover, the actual practice with the NWFD Finnish consulates (which are three: in St.
Petersburg, Petrozavodsk and Murmansk) 2 is that a first time application for a Schengen half a year multiple-entry visa only needs to be supported with a very short list of documents: (1) completed standard application form with a photo; (2) valid foreign passport and (3) In other words, the NWFD residents enjoy quite a particular visa issuance regime and can in fact apply for a Finnish Schengen multiple-entry visa without planning any journeys beforehand (Ahonen 2009) (European Commission 2011 .
Moreover, even such barely-measurable variables like "treatment meted out and attitude displayed by the staff" of different Schengen states' diplomatic representations differ quite substantially among the member states (for more details, see Boratyński et al. 2006; Chajewski et al. 2009 ). Thus, it is obvious that "the European consular departments do not apply the [EU] regulations in a uniform manner..., putting individuals on an unequal footing" (Salminen and Moshes 2009:6) . The question then is whether the EU legislation provides such room for maneuver?
UNITY IN DIVERSITY OR VICE VERSA?
Strangely enough, up until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty no previous EU treaty explicitly mentioned the phrase "common policy" addressing visa issues. It has been only since To understand the degree of uniformity of the procedures and whether they provide enough room for 'national' maneuver one should examine the CCI as for the eight years they have been a precise guide to the visa issuance arrangements of the Schengen countries.
When it comes to the two main peculiarities of the Finnish visa issuance arrangements for the NWFD, namely (1) absence of the requirements to provide any documents neither supporting the purpose and the conditions of stay nor guaranteeing subsistence and return and (2) issuance of Schengen travel multiple-entry visas for half a year and year almost as a rule, the latest 2005 version of the CCI appears to be quite flexible.
Point 2 of the Part III stipulates that "the staff responsible for issuing the visas may exempt the applicant from submitting... documents [supporting the purpose and the conditions of visit]" "if the information supplied is sufficient to enable the diplomatic mission... to ascertain that the applicant is acting in good faith"; moreover, when the subsistence and return issues are concerned Point 3 reads that applicants "must ultimately be able to convince the diplomatic mission... that they have adequate means to ensure subsistence and return" (Council of the European Union 2005:9). Yet, there is no obligation for the consulates to ask the applicant to carry such conviction. When it comes to the 'types' of 'C' visa Point 2. So, given all the mays, it can be concluded that the CCI defined a very loose framework that made it possible for the individual member states to make their visa regimes, though in theory aiming at becoming 'common' for all the Schengen states, diverse. In such a situation, it is hardly possible to speak about really 'common' visa policy of the EU, contrary to our theoretical expectations.
On April 5 th , 2010 the new Community Visa code replaced the Consular instructions. It seems logical to assume that this Code was intended to make the member states stick to a 'more common' visa policy, so that practice does no longer contradict the letter of law, which, as it was There is, therefore, no doubt that Finland obeys the EU legislation. Yet, the requirements for applicants from the NWFD are exceptionally minimal. As pointed out by Matti Sarasmaa, the expert in border questions and visa-matters of the Finnish Permanent Representation, "Finland complies with the EU visa policy but interprets it in a Russian-friendly way" (Paakkola and Monar 2010:31) .
It can be concluded that despite the explicit mentioning of the EU common visa policy in the Lisbon treaty, the 2010 Visa code has not made the member states stick to strict common rules, still leaving the choice of a visa issuance regime to the individual Schengen countries. The question then is why the Finns use this room for 'national' maneuver so enthusiastically?
FINNISH ANOMALY EXPLAINED
Some authors argue that visa issuance arrangements of individual member states can deeply depend, for instance, on the "labour market protection interests" (Salminen and Moshes 2009:17) . This way, Germany stays quite 'cold' on the issue of visa-free regime between the EU and Russia, as there is a strong belief among the Germans that their country is an attractive place for the Russian job-hunters (Salminen and Moshes 2009:17-18) . Similarly, the labour market expectations used to drive the discussion on Bulgarian and Romanian entry into the visa-free zone even after the two countries entered the EU. Finland 2002 Finland , 2003 Finland , 2004 Finland , 2006 Finland , 2007 Finland , 2008 Finland , 2009 Finland , 2010 Finland , 2011 Finland , 2012 Finland , 2013 .
Moreover, an average sum spent by an average Russian in Finland per day was in 2012 between 1.8 and 4.8 times as large as that of any other national coming from the five above-mentioned countries (Matkailun edistämiskeskus / Tilastokeskus -Finnish Tourist Board / Statistics Finland 2013:37-41). And as the Graph 3 shows this has been the trend for more than a decade. Finland 2002 Finland , 2003 Finland , 2004 Finland , 2006 Finland , 2007 Finland , 2008 Finland , 2009 Finland , 2010 Finland , 2011 Finland , 2012 Finland , 2013 .
This situation can be explained by the way the Russians, especially from the NWFD, travel to are not 'happy border-crossing consumers', nor will they become such for a long time" (Paasi 1999:674) , today around 70% of trips made by the Russian citizens to the country are same-day trips (Matkailun edistämiskeskus / Tilastokeskus -Finnish Tourist Board / Statistics Finland 2009 :61, 2010 :23, 2011 :22, 2012 :22, 2013 Thus, it can be concluded that the experience the Finns have with the Russian tourists determines the visa issuance regime the Finns have for Russia and the NWFD, in particular. Yet, it can be equally assumed that any other Schengen state that borders Russia should follow the same path to attract tourists, shoppers and money from Russia.
In this respect, Estonia is almost an ideal case for the comparison. But despite the structural characteristics being very similar to the Finnish ones (such as the distance between St.
Petersburg and the border towns of Lappeenranta, Finland, and Narva, Estonia), Estonia is lagging far behind Finland both in number of issued visas and in 'softness' of its requirements for visa-obtaining procedures. This, on the one hand, does not contradict our conclusion that the economic rationale is a strong predictor of the visa regime a Schengen country chooses for a given third country. Yet, on the other hand, the Estonian case surely challenges the premise that it is only money that determines the visa regime choice. Money may be a necessary condition, but 15 it is far from being sufficient. 'friendly pragmatists', whereas Estonia was placed in the group of 'frosty pragmatists'. Though both groups, according to Leonard and Popescu, "take full advantage of the opportunities offered by Russia's economic growth" and "tend to be pragmatic and oriented towards business interests", the former keeps calm and carries on even when Moscow's actions are questionable in terms of respect for human rights, etc., while the latter gets distracted with such situations, becomes picky and openly raises concerns over Russia's behavior (Leonard and Popescu 2007:36, 42 ). Yet, when visas and cross-border activities are concerned, it seems that being 'frosty' turns out to be more important to Estonia that being a 'pragmatist'.
As Timo Vahavainen argues, this can be explained by historical memories the citizens and the elite have about a third country (more to that, it is, in fact, the way the elite traditionally uses these memories to positively or negatively assess the relations with the third country that plays the role) (Vihavainen 2006:27-29) . Over the last twenty five years a lot has been written about how the Finns related themselves to the Soviet Union before its collapse and how the dissolution of the USSR has changed the way of constructing the Self in Finland (Luostarinen 1989; Medvedev 1999; Browning 2002; Forsberg 2006; Kangas 2011; Izotov and Laine 2013 ). Yet what seem to be two most important factors underlying the Finnish friendliness towards Russia today is how the Finnish elites constructed the Soviets on the one hand, and how the Finnish society got to know the Russians, on the other.
In 1959, after the trip to the Soviet Union Matti Kekkonen, a member of the Finnish Parliament, wrote about Russian people in the newspaper Maakansa: "all the persons we met made a strong impression on us with their openness and sincere friendship" (Kostiainen 1999 ).
Moreover, not only Finnish high-ranked officials visited the USSR. Already in the beginning of 1970s the Finnish tourism to the Soviet Union turned to be a mass tourism which made around 15% of all the incoming tourism to the USSR (Kostiainen 1997) . Starting from no more than 2.5 thousands tourists in mid-1950s, traveling to the Soviet Union became a popular enterprise among the Finns already in the mid-1970s with around 200 thousands Finnish citizens going to its territory each year (Kostiainen 1997) . The large majority of the Finns visiting their Eastern neighbor were ordinary people "who participated in planned, standardised tourist routes", the most popular of which was "a four-day roundtrip from Helsinki to Leningrad, de luxe in every detail but priced at $74 all-inclusive", as the Floridian St. Petersburg Times magazine stated in 1962 (Helsinki-Leningrad 1962) .
Finnish citizens came to the USSR looking for relaxation and amusement; as well they were curious about Russian culture and the Soviet life-style (Kostiainen 1999) . A tiny minority of these tourists, however, were infamous 'vodka-tourists' who caused a lot of trouble in Leningrad participating in "illegal selling and buying of items [such as jeans], currency exchange, etc." (Kostiainen 1999 ) and often being duped by Russian tricksters. Yet, even they nostalgically reminisce about these trips (Tuominen and Lur'e 2008) .
To promote Finnish traveling to the Soviet Union in 1974 the "Finnish-Soviet treaty on travel affairs" was made public which was supposed to facilitate 'visa-obtaining' procedures for both countries. This treaty "was designed in the same way as the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries". It was emphasized at that time that only two more countries outside the block -Iraq and Italy -had the same type of treaties (Kostiainen 1997) , thus, the special relations between the Soviet Union and Finland were clearly stressed.
These relations are still perceived as special ones. In 2008 Perheentupa stated that Finland had "'the most unique' relations with Russia of all European Union countries" (Titova 2008 ) also recalling the Soviet times and the Finns coming to Leningrad for "cheap vodka or cheap entertainment". Reminiscing about that time, he also emphasized that "the first aim for... [his] time as a consul... [would] be to improve the visa issuing procedures for people traveling to
Finland" (Titova 2008 ).
Thus, the Finnish case clearly shows that for a Schengen state to be a 'friendly pragmatist' towards a third country when it comes to issuing visas both economic rationale and the positively constructed historical memories are needed.
CONCLUSION
The article begins with pointing out to one remarkable fact about Finland and its visa issuance arrangement with Russia. This Finnish outlier as compared to the practices of other Schengen member states reasonably seems to be something puzzling taking into account both the explicit declaration of the EU common visa policy made in the Lisbon treaty and the theoretical expectations about Schengen regime and visas built on the Self and the Other approach towards borders.
Dismantling the case through the thorough examination of the EU secondary legislation on visas, the experience with the Russians and historical memories the Finns have about their Eastern neighbor the paper proves that Finland has each and every possibility, rationale and will to apply the EU visa provisions in Russia in the way it does. The most interesting and controversial outcome of such a 'Russian-friendly' regime is, however, the fact that Finland in a sense behaves like a naughty room-mate in the Schengen house inviting its friends in numerous amounts to visit not only its own room but the whole building without any prior notice while the general rule of sharing the house is to invite selected guests for a special dinner at a certain time. Thus, this finding calls for a more complex theory of collective Self and the culture of friendship that would allow for accommodating multiple Selves with their multiple understandings of collective Selfness.
